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FORUM
inspection was authorized by statute; (2) to advise him of
the lawful limits of the inspection; and (3) to assure him
that the person demanding entry is an authorized inspec-
tor. The dissenters felt that these functions added little to
the protection already afforded by statute. In fact, they
concluded that the warrant was "essentially a formality."
436 U.S. at 334. The dissenters accepted the Secretary's
argument that a business, by its special nature and volun-
tary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would
not be permissible in a purely private contract. Justice
Stevens would apply this rationale to any business
regardless of the nature of its business. Yet it would
make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment to limit its
application, in the administrative law contest, to only pri-
vate residences. Such a reading would pave the way to a
challenge by business establishments on equal protec-
tion grounds under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
clause. The majority avoids such a confrontation by uni-
versally applying the Fourth Amendment to administra-
tive searches of residences as well as businesses.
Fair Representation vs.
Systematic Exclusion
by J. Michael Earp
The Supreme Court in Duran u. Missouri, 99 S.Ct. 664
(1979) overturned a Missouri defendant's first degree
murder conviction in holding that a "systematic exclu-
sion of women [which] results in jury venires averaging
less than 15% females violates the Constitution's fair-
cross-section requirement." 99 S.Ct. at 666. The deci-
sion, delivered by Justice White, represents a further
progression in the Whitus to Castendal line of cases
establishing and defining the meaning of a fair trial under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Taylor v. Louisiana 419 U.S. 522 (1975) the Su-
preme Court had ruled that a jury selection system
which automatically excluded all women unless they
chose to register for jury service violated a defendant's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights-in that "petit
juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative
of the community." 419 U.S. at 538. The Missouri sta-
tute 2 here involved, however, did not, ab initio, automat-
ically exclude women from the jury selection process but
I Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975); Alexander u. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Duncan u. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968); and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), all
dealt with the jury selection process, although none are precisely
analogous.
2 Missouri Revised Statutes §494.031(2) (Supp. 1978). See also Mis
souri Const. Art. 1, §22(b).
rather provided them with blanket exemptions, if they
chose to exercise their exemption privilege.
The present case arose when petitioner Duren's con-
victions for first degree murder and first degree robbery
were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri after
the lower court had denied both a pretrial motion to
quash his petit jury panel and a post-conviction motion
for a new trial. Duren claimed that his right to trial by a
jury chosen from a fair-cross-section of his community
was denied because of the Missouri statute granting
women an automatic exemption from jury service upon
their mere request to be exempt. The statute provided
for either disqualification or exemption from jury service
for several listed occupations and other categories, in-
cluding men over 65 and women. A further exemption
for women resulted in practice, because a prospective
woman juror was allowed to claim her exemption at any
time prior to being sworn in as a juror and was treated as
having claimed the exemption if she failed to appear for
jury service on the day for which she was summoned.
Other prospective jurors were required either to make
written or personal application to the court for an ex-
emption or be subject to contempt of court sanctions if
they did not appear for jury service. The effect of the sta-
tute, established by statistical evidence undisputed at the
trial level, was that when Duren's trial began only 15.5%
of those on the weekly venires were women.
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions, holding that the number of females sum-
moned and appearing in the jury selection process were
well above acceptable constitutional limitations. State v.
Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (1977). The state court questioned
the adequacy of the statistical evidence presented by the
petitioner and found that the petitioner had failed to
show unequivocally that the low percentage of women
appearing for jury service was the result of the automatic
exemption for women and not some other cause.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Missouri Su-
preme Court, based its decision on Taylor which held, as
stated previously, that "petit jurors must be drawn from
a source fairly representative of the community." 419
U.S. at 538. To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-
cross-section requirement, the Court held that three
standards must be demonstrated by the person challeng-
ing the selection process:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinc-
tive' group in the community; (2) that the representa-
tion of this group in venires from which juries are se-
lected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community; and (3)
that this representation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury selection process.
99 S.Ct. at 668. The Court, in the present case, found
that the petitioner had successfully met his burden for
each of the three standards.
The first requirement, that the group allegedly ex-
cluded is a distinctive group in the community, was ful-
filled by the Taylor decision, which found women suffi-
ciently numerous and distinct from men such that the
Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement can-
not be satisfied where they are systematically eliminated
from jury panels. 419 U.S. at 531.
The second requirement, that the representation of
the group in jury venires is not fair and reasonable in re-
lation to the group's proportional representation in the
community, was demonstrated by petitioner's statistical
evidence. Petitioner showed that over half (54%) of the
adults in the relevant community were women, and
therefore jury venires consisting of .approximately
15% women were not reasonably representative of the
community. The Court, however, left open the question
as to when a particular discrepancy between the repre-
sentation within the community and that within the
venire fails to be a fair and reasonable representation.
The final requirement in establishing the prima facie
violation, is that the petitioner must show the under-
representation was due to the systematic exclusion of
the distinctive group from the jury selection process. The
petitioner fulfilled the third requirement by showing that
the large disparity in representation occurred over a
lengthy period, spanning nearly one year, rather than
merely on sporadic occasions. Thus, "the cause of the
underrepresentation was systematic - that is, inherent
in the particular jury-selection process utilized." 99 S.Ct.
at 669.
The resulting disproportionate and consistent exclu-
sion of women from the jury wheel and venire stage
was.. .due to the system by which juries were selected
.. [by] the operation of Missouri's exemption criteria
.. Women were therefore systematically underrepre-
sented within the meaning of Taylor.
99 S.Ct. at 670.
The Supreme Court carried its inquiry one step
further. After the defendant established his prima facie
fair-cross-section violation, the burden shifted to the
State to justify the infringement of Constitutional rights
by showing that the "attainment of a fair-cross-section is
in some way incompatible with a significant state inter-
est." 99 S.Ct. at 671. In its brief, the State of Missouri
failed to establish any substantial justification for the
statutory exemption of women from the jury selection
process. During oral argument respondent's counsel
surmised that the only state interest advanced was the
protection of the role played by many women in home
and family life. Though the Court recognized an impor-
tant state interest in having family members available for
the care of children, it felt the state could more appropri-
ately limit its exemption to endure a fair-cross-section
challenge by not exempting broad categories of persons
from jury service.
The State of Missouri having failed, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, to show any significant state interest ad-
vanced by a jury selection process which resulted in a
disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group,
women, fell short of its required burden. The Court,
therefore, reversed and remanded the Missouri
Supreme Court holding.
Justice Rehnquist filed a lone dissent in which he
opined that the only winners in the present decision are
those like the petitioner, now freed of his first degree
murder conviction; the losers are the other members of
the community. Although Justice Rehnquist certainly
overstates his position, 3 the Court has indeed left open
the question of when a jury is or becomes fairly and rea-
sonably representative of the community, leaving the
way open for subsequent challenges on behalf of those
convicted by allegedly constitutionally unrepresentative
juries.4
What of the right of women to be fairly represented in jury
venires? That the petitioner even has standing in the present case
to challenge a jury selection process in which he is not a member
of the excluded group is established by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 522 (1975).
The comparable Maryland statute, the MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. (1974) Title 8, would in all probability not be subject
to a similar line of attack. §8-103 provides that "A citizen may not
be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror... on account of
..sex..." Of course challenges with respect to other possibly ex-
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